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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

1
\

I

vs.
\ Case No.
BETTY LeSOURD, a woman, ALEX / 11866
T. DA VIES and THELMA DA VIES, )\
his wife, and VALLEY BANK &
TRUST COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This Appeal makes the second time the subject case
has been brought before the Court for review. Both appeals have been by the Government, 1 the initial one having inYolved a singular issue of law, and the instant one
lThe initial appeal by the Road Commission was taken from the Judgment
nf District Judge Swan of March 26, 1969, and the case reported under Opinion
No. 11866 of this Court on July 23, 1970. The case was remanded to the trial
Court for further proceedings in accordance with this Court's mandate.

1

being the review of a factual determination made by the
trial Judge. The action has been pending since the filing
of the Condemnation Complaint in September, 1967.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case in condemnation regarding the expropriation by the State Road Commission of certain
property of the Defendant-Landowners situated in Summit County. The property, commonly known as the Kimball Junction Cafe and Service Station, was located at
the intersection of U. S. 40 and the Snyderville-Park
City highways (Kimball Junction). (Tr. 300, 572, 575,
586).

The jurisdictional issues relative to the right of the
Road Commission to condemn the Defendants' properties were not contested and the matter proceeded to trail
on the constitutional and statutory questions of Just
Compensation. The latter questions were submitted for
non-jury trial before District Judge Thornley K. Swan,
and after approximately a week of value testimony from
four expert witnesses in late 1968 and early 1969, Findings and Conclusions were made and Judgment entered.
( R. 48-55) . Upon appeal by the Road Commission, the
case was remanded and additional proceedings ordered
by this Court. 2 Further hearings and trial were held during the latter part of 1970, after which a Memorandum
Decision was issued by the trial Court in January, 1971
224 U.2d 383, 472 P.2d 939 ( 1970).

2

1

and Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment of Just Compensation were made and entered
in March of this year pursuant to Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P.
(R. 71-78).
The State takes this Appeal on claimed error of
fact made by Judge Swan on remand.
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
AFTER REMAND
The Brief of Appellant's counsel herein hardly
presents to this Court an accurate portrayal of the events
of trial in the lower Court subsequent to remittitur in the
first appeal. 3 Indeed, one would believe from a reading
of the Brief that the District Court, upon remand of the
case, listened to some perfunctory argument of lawyers
and then in casual style, delivered a second Memorandum Decision and conformed Amended Findings, Conclusions and Judgment. Such was most certainly not the
case. To the contrary, the trial Court, as set out in the
Statement of Facts below, published its Memorandum
Decision of January 25, 1971, only after extended Motions, Pre-trial Order, and hearings, all in compliance
with this Court's mandate in the first appeal.
lThe Road Commission's Brief is devoid of any discussion or even reference to the specific proceedings which transpired before the District Court upon
remand. While those proceedings were both substantial and material, the closest
Appellant's counsel gets to them is a nondescript comment on page 3 of his
Brief that the trial Judge;
after argument of counsel and deliberation, entered a Memorandum
Decision * * *.
Such slight of hand definition of the post-appeal happenings in this case scarcely
does justice to the ~fforts of the trial Judge and the parties to meet the mandate
of this Court in Opinion # 11866.

3

Upon such proceedings having occurred, Judge
Swan resolved the primary factual determinate incident
to remand, viz., that in the initial Findings and J udgment, severance damage of $5,800.00 had been attributed
to the "nonowned" land as defined by the opinion of this
Court and that such severance damage could be eliminated from the condemnation award by mathematical
deduction. In consequence, Judge Swan issued Amended
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law in accordance with
Rule 52, and thereupon entered the Amended Judgment
of Just Compensation on March IO, 1971. (R. 76-78).
In so doing, the trial Court reduced the condemnation
award by $5,800.00 (as well as interest thereon at 8%
for three years and six months) from the original J udgment of $65,992.00 to the Amended Judgment of

•
,
1

I,
\
I
/

f

(

$60,192.00.

The Road Commission counsel has filed this second '\
appeal alleging insufficiency of evidence, in fact, to I
"justify" the Amended Findings, Conclusions and {
Judgment. (App. Brief pp. 3-4).
I

!
'

i

RELIEF SOUGHT BY ROAD COl\1MISSION I,
ON APPEAL
(
In this Appeal, it is contended that this Court
should now reverse the Findings made and Amended
Judgment entered by Judge Swan on remand, and that t
l
a new trial is required and be ordered.

l

I

4

I
I

Alternatively, Road Commission counsel argues
that this Court should factually determine that the value
testimony of the Government's sole appraisal witness,
Austin, was the only competent evidence received in the
entire trial and that this Court, therefore, order judgment in favor of the State in the amount of the Austin
appraisal, $34,500.00. (App. Brief p. 4) .

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I

!
I'

i
i

'

I
I

\

I

{
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The failure of Commission counsel to address himself to or discuss the post-appeal proceedings conducted
by the trial Court in response to this Court's mandate in
the first appeal, requires that the Respondent-Landowners present separately their Statement of the facts
pursuant to Rule 75(p) (2) U.R.C.P. 4 Moreover, because of the context and form in which Road Commission's counsel has framed his Statement, no part of the
same is adopted in the Landowners' statement.
I. The Subject Property.

In 1967, the year of condemnation, the Kimball
Junction Cafe and Service Station was situated on the
"swing" southwest corner of U. S. 40 and the Park City
Highway, with full and direct access to both highway
arteries. (Tr. 300, 572, 57 5). The property, 1.33 acres,
4Qf the 9 pages of the Road Commission's Brief devoted to th_e Statement

of Facts, approximately V2 of one page is taken with the events o~ tnal upon re-

n1and before Judge Sw«n. In predominant measure, the Appellants Sta.tement. of
Facts simply defaults in comrng to gnps with the relevant issues with which
this Appeal must concern itselt, as a matter of law.
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was developed with restaurant, service station, and smal
fishing-tourist type cabins. (Tr. 70, 278). It was undis.
puted that the highest and best use of the property, at tht
date of service of summons, was for the existing com
mercial purposes. (Tr. 383, 502, 575, 621). The taking
by the Road Commission knocked out the sanitary sys.
tern and storage tanks of the property (Tr. 3ll, 118.
406), the right-of-way line came within less than orn
foot of the remaining service station pumps (Tr. 311),
and the property was deprived of all access to U. S. 4~
and the Park City Highways (Tr. 514, 595, 596). Ji
was the judgment of all value witnesses, including the
State, that the highest and best use of the subject prop·
erty, after condemnation, was no longer as a commercial
service station-restaurant (Tr. 513, 662).
2. The Initial Appeal.

On original appeal, this Court was presented witn
the issue of whether open and undisturbed possession
under claim and color of title by the Landowners wm
ii
sufficient, as a matter of law, to support an award oi
severance damage to remaining property. State Roan
Commission v. Davies, et al., 24 U.2d 383, 472 P.2d 93~
( 1970). The Court determined that such a showing wai
not legally adequate and that severance damages coulo
not be awarded as to land ( nonowned) which the owner
could not make a showing of full title, by record or ad·
verse possession. The case was thus remanded back to
the trial Court with directions to eliminate, if possible
from the Findings and Judgment any factual considera
6

al tion of severance damages to such "nonowned" property,

fa title to which had not completely ripened as of the date

ht of condemnation. Under the Opinion, if and only if the
m trial Judge were unable to make the factual segregation
mg of severance damage to the "nonowned" land and elimis· nate the same from the Judgment, was a new trial to be
18. ordered. The mandate of the Court in this regard was
Hlt specific:
I),
"The judgment is reversed and the case re4~
manded with directions to the trial judge to eliminate from his findings and judgment all severJi
ance damages a warded for the nonowned land if
he
he now can do so-otherwise a new trial is order1p·
ed." Page 940 of 472 P.2d.
ial
No petition for rehearing with respect to the reversal or the mandate in the Court's Opinion, was filed
by any party. (See Record and Docket Book) .
3. Lower Court Proceedings Upon Remand.
)JI

Upon remittitur of the case, the following proceedoi ings were had before District Judge Swan:

fi)

1J
li
ii

0

(a) On October 26, 1970, the Landowners filed
before the trial Court a "Motion for Elimination of
Damage to Non Record Title and Determination of
Just Compensation In Accordance with Supreme
Court Mandate." (R. 94-100). The Motion evidenced, as undisputed, that all commercial buildings, facilities and appurtenances of the Kimball
Junction Cafe and Service Station were situated on
the 1.33 acres of property, the title to which was not

7

in contest. ( R. 95) . No commercial buildings, im·
provements or facilities of the cafe or service station
were located on "nonowned" property as defined by
the Supreme Court Opinion. ( R. 95) . Under the
mandate in Davies, the trial Court was to excise any
severance damage to the "nonowned" land. It was
submitted by the Motion that as a matter of fact,
the trial Court in the first instance did not allocate
severance damage to such "nonowned" land, or that
if severance damage was so ascribed, it could not in
fact exceed a sum certain, but that in all events, the
trial Court should proceed to eliminate and strike
any such severance damage to "nonowned" land and
otherwise enter appropriate Amended Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment. ( R. 98) .
The Road Commission filed no pleadings and
did not contest in form the Landowners' Motion.
(b) A prehearing conference was held before
Judge Swan on October 28, at which time the issues
raised by the Opinion and Mandate of the Supreme
Court were explored and discussed in depth and a
course of procedure adopted to resolve the ques·.
tions. (Vol. IV Tr. 2).
( c) Judge Swan, on November 10, entered an
"Order Establishing Issues to be Presented ana
Determined in Accordance with Supreme Cour!I
Opinion." (R. 101-103). Under the Order, three/
factual issues were prescribed for determination b)
the trial Judge :

1

8

O·

fl

y

e

y

S

t,

tt

1e

e
d

( 1) Did the trial Court, in the initial J udg-

ment, find severance damage to the "nonowned" land?

( 2) Did the trial Court, in the initial J udgment, find some severance damage attributable to the "nonowned" land and if so ,
how much?
( 3) Should the trial Court now find that it is

factually impossible to separate, distinguish, and eliminate severance damage to
the "nonowned" land and if so, should a
new trial be ordered? ( R. 102-103) .
The Order was approved by counsel for both
parties.
(d) Thereafter in November, a hearing went
forward before the trial Court, at which both counsel presented extended argument on the attendant
factual issues as framed in the Prehearing Conference Order of November 10. (Vol. IV, Tr. 1-34).
On the one hand, the Landowners contended
that the Supreme Court had passed on an extremely
narrow issue in the appeal (i.e., severance damage
to "nonowned" land) . That such question was merely one aspect of the larger case and that this Court,
by its Opinion, had not intended to require a new
trial and new findings on all other elements of the
suit (such as the fair market value of land, improvements, and fixtures taken and damaged in the un-

9

disputed area) , unle.ss the trial Judge factually de.
termined that segregation and elimination of sever.
ance damage to the "nonowned" land were not pos.
sible. (Vol. IV, Tr. 2-20). Thus it was urged that
the mandate of this Court directed the lower Court
"to eliminate from his Findings and Judgment sev.
erance damages awarded for the nonowned land rt
he could do so" therefore making unnecessary a re·
trial of issues that were uneffected and untoucheo
by the Supreme Court Opinion. (Vol. IV, Tr. 2-7).
Landowners' counsel then demonstrated to the trial
Court the methodology which might be employed,
in the Court's discretion, to strike the "nonowned"
severance damage from the original Findings ano
Judgment. (Vol. IV, Tr. 7-20, 27-33).
State counsel, on the other hand, argued that it
was a factual impossibility for the trial Court, m
finder of fact, to isolate or eliminate severance dam·
age to the "nonowned" land. (Vol. IV, Tr. 20-27).
It was contended that State counsel had not cross·
examined the valuation experts of the Landownen
regarding the impact upon their total opinions of
the "nonowned" land. 5 (Vol. IV, Tr. 26-27). The
State in its argument offered no conceivable methoo
or amount for the eliminiation of severance damage
to the "nonowned" land. At no time did State coun·
sel argue before Judge Swan that the value testi·,
5Jt was noted in rebuttal argument that if cross-examination of the Lani !
owners' witnesses had not been conducted at trial, the reason was because State'
counsel had voluntarily elected not to pursue such. (Vol. IV, Tr. 28-29).

10

l·

15.

at

rt

\'·
tl

e-

~
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11

l,
I"

many of the Landowners' witnesses, Kiepe, Palmer
and Mooney was legally incompetent.
The matter was thereupon submitted for consideration.
( e) On January 25, 1971, the trial Court issued its .Memorandum Decision in which it stated:

"That this Court, in its original Findings and
Judgment, did attribute some severance damage
to that land which was referred to by the Supreme Court as "nonowned land" and such severance damage can be eliminated from the Findings and Judgment; that the element of severance damage to the property, characterized as
"nonowned land," played a small part in the
Court's considerations of this matter in the initial
trial. A review of the testimony of the expert appraisal witnesses at trial, and especially the breakdown of the categories of land in such opinion
evidence, the exhibits, and the Court's calculations based thereon, indicate that the elimination
of severance damages to the "non-owned land"
is supported under the record and can be accomplished by the elimination of the rear non-owned
land and other rear property from the case, leaving as the property under consideration the frontage area of 1.33± acres agreed upon by counsel,
the title to which is undisputed." ( R. 86).
Judge Swan observed that the testimony of
the State's witness, Austin, was of significance in
arriving at the factual conclusion that severance
damage to the "nonowned" land could be excised
from the Findings:
11

"Of particular importance to the Court in elim
inating severance damage to the "non-ownea
land" is the evidence of the State's witness, Greg.
ory Austin, who testified that he considered a1
part of the basic commercial unit 1.33 acres oi
land, and that as to the balance of the properti
the same was worth $2,000.00 per acre before
condemnation and was of the same value after
condemnation (Tr. 693). In other words, under
Mr. Austin's appraisal, there was no difference in
the value of the "non-owned land" before ano
after condemnation." ( R. 86).
The trial Judge then factually indicated tha!
$5,800.00 was the sum which had been previously
allocated and awarded for severance damage to the
"non-owned" land and:
"That the Court can eliminate from its Find·
ings such severance damage by a reduction in the
Judgment of $5,800.00 * * *." (R. 86).
The Memorandum Decision was concluded by
a mathematical calculation of the fair market value
of the property, title to which was not in dispute.
Before and After condemnation, the difference in
the two sums being $60,192.00. The Court declared:

"* * * The latter sum is $5,800.00 less than the
original Findings and Judgment of $65,992.00'
as just compensation to be awarded the land·
owners. The Court thus concludes that $5,800.00
is the amount of severance damages to the "non·
owned land," that such should be eliminated fron11
the Findings and Judgment, and that the J udg· i
ment of this Court should be accordingly enteret.\!
for just compensation in the sum of $60,192.00. '
(R. 87).

12

( f) Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were made (R. 71-75) and an Amended Judgment of Just Compensation thereupon entered on March 10. (R. 76-78). From the Amended
Judgment, the State prosecutes this second Appeal.
4. Value Evidence Supportive of Amended Find-

ings.

The testimony at trial upon which the lower Court,
as trier of fact, could find the fair market value of the
undisputed land vis-a-vis the "nonowned" land and thus
eliminate severance damage therefrom, runs through the
testimony of all the value experts. Since the case was a
non-jury trial, the value testimony by both sides was submitted through the proffer of economic summation
sheets on legal sized paper, for quick and convenient
reference by the Court and counsel. (Ex. D24, D29, D31
and P38). Such evaluation sheets were ciphered so as to
specify, with particularity, each of the elements of value
as part of the larger appraisal. The fair market value of
the owned land, as contrasted to the "nonowned" land,
market value of the improvements and fixtures measured
as part of the realty, both in their condition Before and
After condemnation, the fair market value of the land
taken6 and the damage to the remainder land caused by
the taking and construction of the public project were
each and all broken out and defined separately as part of
the witness's total opinion. (Ex. 24, 29, 31, 38).
6Title to the property actually condemned by the Road Commission was

nncr in Joubt and was acknowlcJged to be in these Landowners. (Tr. 18-19).
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Incident to the fin dings of the trial Court, the fo].
lowing evidence was a part of the record:

Marcellus Palmer (Ex. 24) ... Market valUt
of the land upon which the commercial improve.
ments were located was $12,500.00 per acre. (Tr.
392, 393, 399) . Three comparable sales were supportive of that evaluation. (Tr. 394-399). Improvements and fixtures located on the undisputed land
and appraised as part of the realty, were evaluated
pursuant to the income and cost replacement approaches to value. (Tr. 402, Ex. 24) . The value o!
the "nonowned" land was also determined and stated
separately. (Ex. 24, Tr. 399). The market value al
remaining undisturbed land and improvements were
evaluated and denoted. (Ex. 24A, Tr. 399, 418·
419).

Werner Kiepe (Ex. 31) ... Land value of the
owned commercial area was stated and specifically
segregated from the back or "nonowned" land. (Ex.
31 p. 3, Tr. 586, 601-602). Improvements and fix.
tures, as part of the realty, were likewise a ppraisea
and their value demonstrated separately on the sum·:
mary chart Exhibit 31. The value of the properD·1
remaining, title to which was uncontested, was in·;
dependently catalogued from the "nonowned" land,
along with the remainder improvements and fix·'
tures on property admittedly owned. (Ex. 31A, Tr.
601-602) . Mr. Kiepe utilized sales of related prop·
erties to establish the value ascribed to the undis·
puted land. (Tr. 587-593).
14
!

I

Jerome H. Mooney (Ex. 29) . . . Property
within the undisputed area was appraised at
$13,000.00 per acre, together with improvements
and fixtures thereon under the cost and ca pitalization methodology of evaluation. (Ex. 29, Tr. 506508) . The witness testified to four sales of property deemed comparable to the property admittedly
owned by the Defendants. (Tr. 508-512). The value
of the remaining owned property After condemnation was separately appraised as well as the remnant improvements and fixtures being set out specially. (Tr. 513-516).
All of the value experts for the Landowners testified with respect to a sale or sales of other remnant tracts
as comparative to the remaining owned land, in arriving
at severance damage opinion, as well as factors of depreciation, diminution in value, and loss of economic utility
of the remaining property and improvements. (Tr. 406H7, 516-517, 606-607).

Testimony and evidence of the Landowners' experts
on market value of the property Before and After condemnation, comparable sales, land value of the taking
and severance damage were received by the trial Court
without objection from the State as to the competency
or relevancy thereof.

Gregory Austin (Ex. 38) ... The single value
witness called by the Road Commission, Mr. Austin
testified that the "nonowned" land had no effect
upon and made no difference in his appraisal of the
15

owned land, either Before or After condemnation.
(Tr. 693). The witness found that the "nonowned"
land had no bearing upon any determination of sev.
erance damage (Tr. 686, 693) and that his total
opinion of land value condemned and severance
damages was without regard to "nonowned" prop.
erty. (Ex. 38, Tr. 693, 719).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AS FACT FINDER, THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS
FULLY EMPOWERED TO EXERCICE AND
ELIMINATE THE SEVERANCE DAMAGE
TO THE NONO,VNED LAND FROM HIS CAL·'
CULATION OF DAMAGE AND TO AMEND
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGlVIENT ACCORD·
INGLY.
District Judge Swan sat as the trier of fact in this
case. He heard the testimony, received and examined
the exihibits, observed the demeanor of the witnesses,
and listened to argument. It was the trial Court who
weighed the testimony and exhibits for their probative
value and determined, based upon the evidence and per·
sonal notes, wherein the preponderance rested. It was
that Court who reviewed the economic summation charts
of each value expert wherein the categories of land,
owned and "nonowned," improvements and fixtures,
were segregated and categorized. And it was that Court,
16

who upon remand of this case on appeal, reviewed the
" evidence, the summation sheets and his personal notes,
and factually resolved that it was possible to ascertain
the severance damage which the trial Judge, himself,
e had previously allocated in the initial Findings and
Judgment to the "nonowned" land and that it was possible to strike and eliminate that severance damage from
his Amended Findings and Judgment. It is this factual
determination as to which State counsel seeks review in
this appeal.
The rule of law applicable in the instant case is so
well founded in decisional precedent that it stands above
all but the most academic debate. Broad discretion is
bestowed on the trial Court as a fact finder in a nonjury trial. Sweeney v. Happy Valley Inc., 18 U.2d 113,
417 P .2d 126 ( 1966). His is the prerogative to believe or
disbelieve the testimony of one or more witnesses, to
ferret the conflicts in the evidence, to draw inferences,
to determine reliability, and to measure and calculate
the factual elements of damage. Marks v. Continental
Casualty Co., 19 U.2d 119, 427 P.2d 387 (1967); Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 18 U.2d 386, 424 P.2d 136 (1967).
The discretionary scope of the trial Judge in passing
upon questions of fact in a non-jury action has no less
breadth than that of a venire in a trial by jury. Evans v.
Stewart, 17 U.2d 308, 410 P.2d 999 (1966) .7 While the
;The Court stated in the Evans decision that:
"We have often stated that the jury has broad prerogative in
determining issues of fact; and when it (the trial judge} has t~e
role of trier of the facts, this 1s of course equally true of the tnal
Court."
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precedent from this Court, alone, is thus legion on the
prerogatives and authority of the trial Judge on matters:
of fact in a non-jury trial, the position of the Road Com-i
mission in this appeal seems to be taken in patent disregard. Simply put, that position holds that Judge Swan
erred in his "finding that severance damages to the non-'
owned land could be eliminated" from the trial Court'i
Findings and Judgment. See Appellant's Brief Point I,
p. 13. It is said therein that there is no evidence in the
1
record in which the expert witnesses specifically deline-:
ated and inventoried the land into categories of owned
and "nonowned" property, and that consequently, Judge!
Swan could not, from all the testimony, arrive at a cal·
culation as to the amount of severance damage whicn
he, as fact finder, initially attributed to the "nonowned"
property.
I
1
1

1

Such argument is preposterous and falls of its own
weight. There is no ignominious rule that the trier of
fact must view the evidence in a vacuum divorced from
all common experience, that he must passively accept or
reject the land value of particular acreage under a wit·
ness's testimony, that he adhere to some slide rule for·
mula of severance damages, or that he must somehow
wed himself, as a mechanical robot, to the precise testi·
mony of the witness. Indeed, the opposite proposition
holds sway, that the fact finder is accorded wide latitude
to draw from the evidence such factual derivatives as he
deems the weight and preponderance suggests. As stated
by this Court in Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 22 U.2d
49, 448 P.2d 709 (1968):
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e

l·'

I,

""\Ve have no disagreement with the proposition that the fact-trier should not be permitted to
arbitrarily ignor competent, credible and uncontradicte<l ev1dence. Nevertheless, he is not bound
to slavishly fallow the evidence and the figures
given by any particular witness. Within the limits
of reason it is his prerogative to place his own appraisal upon the evidence which impresses him as
credible and to draw conclusions therefrom in accordance with his own best judgment. * * *"

1e

In Weber Basin Conservancy District v. Nelson, 11
d U.2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 (1960), a condemnation case, it
• I was contended that the trier of fact could not accept one
~e
]. phase of the testimonial evidence as to land value Before
:n condemnation and also adopt in the findings inconsistent
r opinion evidence on the remainder value After condem1 nation. In rejecting such argument, this Court declared:

e-'

1

1

"The jury was entitled to believe or disbelieve
in part or in whole the testimony of the two appraisers. Regardless of how arrived at, the jury
chose the 'before' value of Plaintiff's appraiser
and the 'after' of the Defendants' appraiser.***
This Court cannot go behind the answers and
analyze or speculate as to the process by which
the jury arrived at them."
The facts in the case at hand come short of even
J
the rule in Nelson for there is nothing to prompt the
suggestion herein of inconsistent opinion testimony or
' findings. The point to be made, however, is that the trial
Court is not required to cling to the formal, structured
testimony in strait-jacket fashion. It may and it did derive from the perimeter of the testimony the amount of
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severance damage attributed to the "nonowned" lam
and such severance damage was stricken from th1
Amended Findings and Judgment. In so doing, th
Judgment was reduced in the sum of $5,800.00 togethe
with forty-two months of interest at 8%, to the benefi
of the State Road Commission.
I. The trial, Court Findings of Fact are presurmi

correct.

Judge Swan found, as fact, that some severanc1
damage was allocated to the "nonowned" land in th1
original Findings and Judgment, although such "playei :
a small part in the Court's considerations," that the "elim'
I
ination of severance damages to the "nonowned" land i ,
supported under the record and can be accomplished b1;
the elimination of the rear nonowned land" and that sud! 1
severance damage of $5,800.00 "should be eliminateoj
from the Findings and Judgment." ( Memor. Dec. R. 8~.1
87). The Brief of Appellant fails to recognize that sud!
Findings of the trial Court carry a presumption of cor·!
rectness and validity in the judicial review and that thllI
Court, on appeal, will canvass the evidence in a ligh'.
favorable to the Findings. As stated by this Court il

Sullivan v. Turner, 22 U.2d 85, 448 P.2d 907 (1968)

i1

'11
01 a

"When the trial judge has made findings
fact and entered judgment thereon, they are en·
titled to the presumption of correctness; on appd e
the evidence is surveyed in the light favorable!t r
them; and if there is any reasonable basis in tlit I[
evidence to support them they will not be over·l 11
turned."
I
20
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I

I

The "reasonable basis" test in Sullivan as supportive
h1 of the trial Court's Findings has not at all begun to be
th examined by the State in this Appeal.
he.

nl

efi

Ui

POINT II.

THE DISTRICT JUDGE FOLLOWED TO
THE LETTER THE :MANDATE OF THIS

COURT ON THE FIRST APPEAL.

The Statement of Facts herein discusses with some
amplification, the legal issues raised in the first appeal
iei and the Opinion of this Court. The Decision carried a
mmandate to the trial Court to remove from his Findings
Ii;
·and Judgment any severance damages awarded to the
b1 nonowned land, if such were possible. The language of
1d
eol the mandate was not unclear:

lei

th'.

%1

~

"The judgment is reversed and the case remanded with directions to the trial judge to eliminate from his findings and judgment all severance damages awarded for the non-owned land if
he now can do so-otherwise a new trial is ordered."

On remand, and after a full fledge of motions, hear) ings and argument, the District Court, in compliance
. with the mandate, excised $5,800.00 in severance dam01
n· age, originally attributed to the nonowned land, and
~ eliminated such from his Amended Findings and J udgti ment. That the trial Judge was able to make such calcu11 lution and deduction is manifest from the language of
the Memorandum Decision and from the Findings of
il
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Fact. Only NOW State counsel is heard to complau
with respect to Judge Swans' observance of this Court.
mandate. The meaning of the mandate was perfecth
apparent when the Opinion was filed on July 23, 1970
i.e., that the trial Court should excise from his Finding.
any severance damage to the nonowned land and by s1
doing, thus avoid a full trial de novo on every aspect oti
value and damages in the case (none of which were be.:
fore this Court or affected in the first appeal) .8

1

State counsel was well advised of this Court's man
date and charge to the trial Judge when the opinion in
the first appeal was issued. If he is dissatisfied with thai
mandate now, he was dissatisfied with the mandate then'
and accordingly, the appropriate remedy was to havti
brought before this Court, on a Petition for Rehearing.I
his alleged grievance. In a word, the complaint of Ap·I
pellant' s counsel is directed not to the Amended Fina·
ings and Judgment of Judge Swan, but rather to thi.,
Court's mandate. An attempt to resurrect at this belated
time such claimed error is ill-fated in this Appeal. Dat•i,

v. Payne ~ Day, Inc., 12 U.2d 107, 363 P.2d 49!
( 1961); Prudential Federal Savings ~ Loan Assoc. r
St. Paul Insurance Co., 22 U.2d 70, 448 P.2d 721
(1968).

Judge Swan's Amended Findings, Conclusions ana
Judgment should be affirmed. Johnson v. Kayle, 7 U.2°
27,317P.2d596 (1957).
8The laudable judicial policy not to require needless litigation with respo<
to issues already and finally resolved has had long tenure at this Court. Pe/fl',
Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 ( 1948); Gaddis Inv. Co. v. MorrtJon.
U.2d 152, 289 P.2d 730 (1955).
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POINT III.

THE APPEAL OF THE ROAD COMMISSION
HEREIN FAILS TO PRESENT ANY QUESTION OF LA1i\T SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY
THIS COURT.

This Court, through the whole span of its decision
making process, has been mindful of its constitutional
role in appellate review. That rule has been stated with
clarity and firmness in a host of cases from Nelson v.
Southern Pacific Co., 15 Utah 325 49 Pac. 644 (1897),
through Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 Pac.
980 ( 1898), to the recent case of Brigham v. 1lfoon Lake
Electric Assoc., 24 U.2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 ( 1970), that
in cases at law, an appeal from the District Court shall be
only on questions of law. The footings for this fundamental legal axiom is the Judicial Article of the Constitution,9 the proscription of which is:
"***in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone."
Even in a suit wherein this Court might conceivably
disagree with or otherwise resolve the facts differently
than the trial Judge, this Court has been circumspect in
not substituting its factual judgment in lieu of that of
the lower Court. Lyman, et al. vs. Town of Price, 222
Pac. 599 (Utah 1924); In Re-Alexamder's Estate, 104
l'.tah 286, 139 P .2d 432 ( 1943). Thus, this Court has
l1eld that in cases at law, the scope of the judicial review
as to matters of fact is one of determining whether there

-

9Articlc VIII Sec. 9. See also the limitations in 78-2-2 U.C.A., 1953.
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is a reasonable basis in the record of trial upon whid
the Findings of the lower Court may be premised. If so a
the judicial review of the facts is at an end. Western Ga, e
Appliances Inc. v. Serval, Inc., 123 Utah 229, 257 P.ir. c
950 (1953).

An action in eminent domain is fundamentally a cai1
at law. Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 6 §26.731; 6i,
3-1 U.C.A. 1953. In particular, the issue of Just Com
pensation is of legal character with the right of juf'.
trial preserved. Rule 38, U.R.C.P., 78-34-10 U.C.A
1953 as amended. Contrary to this plethora of blackletter
law, Road Commission's counsel bottoms this appeal on
issues of factual essence. Firstly, it is contended that thb
Court factually declare that the trial Judge could not
in fact, eliminate severance damages to the "nonownea
land from his Findings and Judgment and reversal i1/
sought on that score. S~condly, it is contended. that thi:I'
Court factually determme that the value testimony o;
the State was the only credible, competent evidence at[
trial and that this case, therefore, be remanded anothe:\
time with instructions to enter Judgment squarely on tl1tl
Road Commission's testimony of Mr. Austin. Each a~·1
ser~ion requires of this Court a .de novo analysis an~
weighing of the facts. Each P~mt suggest~ that Ull!l
Court should determine whether it concurs with the far·
tual determinations made by the trial Judge. But bot~
Points are defective and lack standing in this Court whe~
measured by the light of controlling constitutional, statu·
tory, and decisional precedent.
24
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It is respectfully submitted that this Court decline,
so as in the past, a factual review and determination of the
ia, evidence in this case. The trial Court herein, on remand,
.ii. operated strictly within the disciplines of this Court's
mandate and made Amended Findings and entered
Judgment accordingly. Those Findings and Judgment
aii should remain undisturbed.

6i,

!Ill

lll'·

POINT IV .

.A

:ter CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S CLAIM, THE
on RECORD OF TRIAL CONTAINS SUBSTAN:hb TIAL,
COMPETENT EVIDENCE UPON
iol WHICH THE TRIAL COURT COULD DEea TERMINE AND ELIMINATE FROM ITS
l 1FINDINGS SEVERANCE DAMAGES TO THE
th~;I NONO\i\TNED LAND.
111

The Statement of Facts herein outlines in some deheq tail the evidence of trial which is supportive of and would
tl1ti enable District Judge Swan to calculate and determine
a~·I the severance damage to the "nonowned" land and to
n~I eliminate that damage from the Findings and J ud~ment.
U1i1 See Statement of Facts, pages 13 through 16. Without
'ar·I recounting that evidence fact by fact here, it is sufficient
ot~ to say that there is a wealth of admittedly competent
ne~ testimony upon which the trial Court could arrive at a
tu· ineasurement of the amount of severance damage which
it had, in the inital Findings and Judgment, attributed
I to the "nonowned" land.

: at[

1

I

I
I
I
I
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The economic summation sheets (Exhibits 24, ~:
31 and 38) of all the witnesses illustrate that each valu
expert made opinion judgments separating the bar
"nonowned" land from the front acreage owned by U!
Defendants. The specification of land categories esM
lished by the witnesses for the Landowners and the valm
ascribed to that land which, of necessity, delineated tn
nonowned and the owned property, is so marked am
pronounced throughout the transcript and evidence tha:
no one of reasonable mind could be misled or miscon
ceive the testimonal and exhibit evidence. The fact t!Ja:
Mr. Kiepe found 1.8 acres of prime commercial pro~
erty, that Mr. Palmer found 2+ acres of higher commer·
cial value and that Mr ..Mooney found 2 acres in tha'
category, with the balance of the land (all of which wa:
"nonowned") having a substantially lower use and mar
ket value, does not require that the finder of fact be tiei
in lock step to those precise value opinions. The fact tha1
Mr. Austin for the State found that precisely 1.33 acre~!
of land had a high commercial value, with the balanceol;
the property, "nonowned,'' of a lesser value did not re·
quire the Court to accept in bushel basket form, each elei
ment of that appraisal.
:
1

I

It is most significant, however, to note that tl1r!
Austin appraisal, itself, forms a part of the basi~!
upon which the trial Court could predicate findin~j
in the case, for this particular witness did :lassify w: ,
higher commercial value at 1.33 acres. '¥h1le the tn~,1
Court need not have, it could have taken the 1.33 acre!
as the defined property under the Austin testimony, anr
!
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I

applied to that acreage value estimates as found by the
preponderance of the testimony from that of Messrs.
Kiepe, Palmer and/or Mooney. Even Odds Inc. v. Nielson, supra; Weber Bw;in Conservency District v. Nelson,
supra; authorities in Point I. It is to be emphasized that
the trial Court could have made such finding, but it need
not have done so to sustain the findings under the record
of trial in this case. But the Austin testimony has additional significance as part of the larger record, for he
testified that the "nonowned" land made no difference,
whatsoever, to his findings of compensation and damage; included or excluded from the trial, the nonowned
land mattered not to his damage appraisal. (See Memor.
Dec. of January 25, 1971, p. 2, Tr. 693).

It was and is the trial judge's prerogative, and his
alone, to determine from the weight of the evidence that
less than 1.8 acres had a highest and best use for commercial purposes, to predicate market value thereon, and to
determine, as a result of the partial-taking by the Road
Commission of the condemned land, the severance damage to the remaining owned land. In corollary fashion,
it was the trial Court's prerogative to review the evidence,
and its probative value, find the preponderance and factually calculate, if determined possible, the severance
damage which was allocated to the "nonowned" land in
the original Findings and Judgment. The efforts of Appel!ant' s counsel in this appeal to require that the trial
Court's fact finding process be structured and stereotyped so as to conform on the mark with the exactitudes
27

of the opinion evidence, is in vain. 10 Judge Swan labore 1
under no such aberration in this lawsuit, and counsel t
attempt to bring about a contrary holding should be n c
jected.

t

The central question is whether the evidence sul r
mitted as to the market value of the land, improvemem 8
and fixtures situated thereon, both Before and Aftt i
condemnation forms a reasonable bases upon which tl i
trial Judge could make findings with respect to lli
damages originally allotted to the "nonowned" lan1
After careful scrutiny of evidence and record Judi
Swan found, in fact, such determination could be, an.
should be made pursuant to this Court's mandate an c
such severance damage of $5,800.00 together with [ r
0
terest, was thereupon eliminated in the Amended Fini
.
11
mgs
an d Ju dgment.
I~

The opinion testimony and exhibits of the Lan( owners was proffered and received without objection\ ce
State counsel regarding its competency, relevancy a ::
general admissibility. No objection of that nature ;'.
whatsoever form was raised by the State in the fiJ.
appeal. And more importantly, no argument or contei ~
tion on that score was ever advanced by the State beforl ~
Judge Swan by motion, in prehearing conferences, hear 10
ings or argument upon remand of the case in the f~ ~
~I

II'

"

lOThe law abhors a mechanical fact determination. In reality, State Colll' ili
says by his Brief, that the trier of fact must find, on damage questions four·W: :
directly on the testimony of the witness-that findings cannot be made bd::
the range of the evidence. Such esotenc pos1t1on has been repudiated
:,
State Road CommiJJion v. Williams, 22 U.2d 301, 452 P.2d 548 (1969).
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appeal. 11 And so the answer to the question must be that
sel there was adequate, competent, admissible evidence adn duced upon which the trial Judge could and did find the
amount of severance damage which he initially attributed
to the "nonowned" land. It follows a fortiori that having
ill made that factual determination, the elimination of such
em severance damages from the Findings and Judgment
J!t is to be sustained, pursuant to the mandate of this Court
1 tl in the first appeal.

f!

lli

I. The cases cited by State counsel are irrelevant.

an1

1di

Appellant refers this Court to several federal decisions and two State holdings in an effort to support the
an
. position that there is no competent evidence in the record
I[
. · of trial to sustain the Findings of the District Judge.
lTil
'The decisions cited are unremarkable 12 and we have no
~uarrel with the proposition of the law expressed therean.

1

Ill( _ __

UThe absence of such objection being raised on the first appeal and most

1

II' certainly the failure to rnterpose the same before the tnal Judge upon rem1ttltur,

precludes the raising of any such issue (even assuming arguendo that any such
which it is not), for the first time before this Court.
v. Keller Corporation, 15 U.2d 318, 392 P.2d 620
(1964); Huber v. Newman, 106 Utah 363, 145 P.2d 780 (1944).
fii' . As a matter of fact, Appellant's counsel not only failed to raise thi.s objec~on before Judge Swan but he has chanf!.ed his theory from the quest10n prelew iented to the trial Court and the issue that he attempts to press here. Before
Judge Swan on remand, it was State counsel's lament that the lower Court must
.fOf ~ant a new trial because cross-examination of Landowners' expert had not been
1onducted relative to the "nonowned" land in the trial. The response to that
e31 rontention was that the absence of such cross-examination was a matter of elecfo lion of State counsel and that he had opted voluntarily not to conduct such crossrxamination. No such cross-examination was ever attempted and no ruling ever
11ued which would have foreclosed the same. State counsel has not raised the
"'JJ·exami 11 ation question in this appeal at all. Appellant cannot now switch
illl' fut theory of his case on appeal from that presented to the Court below. Davies
:i~ :Mulholland, 25 U.2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970).

aDob1ection was well taken,
e Porcupine Reservoir Co.

I
1

1 ~Most of the decisions were pulled from Briefs filed in a recently tried
:deral condemnation suit in Salt Lake City.

cl1· .
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in. But it is a plain and simple fact that such decisio11
have not a whit to do with this case, or with the l 1'inding:
and Judgment of the trial Court. The opinion evidem,
before Judge Swan that enabled him to determine tn1
amount of severance damages to the "nonowned" Ian~
was not speculative, was not conjectural and was no
based upon hypotheses. It was, to the contrary full1
competent and admitted evidence which permitted tli;
trial Court, in its discretion as the trier of fact, to deter
mine the nonowned severance damage and to excise am
strike that damage from the Amended Findings ani:
Judgment.
POINT V.
CONTRARY TO THE CLAIM OF STATI
COUNSEL, THE LANDO\VNERS FULLY
SUSTAINED THEIR BURDEN OF PROO!
ON COMPENSATION AND DAMAGESD
THE CASE.
Under Point II of Appellant's Brief, it is conteno
ed that the Landowners failed to meet their burden oi
proof on the issues of fair market value of the land taken,
and damages to the remainder. Cases are cited on tn~
subject of the Landowners' burden. 13
It would only be to dignify an otherwise frjyo]oil':
point to discuss this question in any depth under the rec,
· Court on t he su b.1ect, t I1e A ppe II ant (fail<
13The most recrnt cases of this
1WI
'
note State Road Comm. '" Papuniko/a.r, 19 U.2d 153, 427 P.2d 749
Stat~ Road Comm."· Tuggarl, 19 U.2d 247, 430 P.2d 167 (1967).
j
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ord made in this case. It is utter nonsense to allege that
under the testimony of the Landowners with respect to
the value of the owned land, Before and After condemnation, the market value of the property condemned and
the damages to the remaining owned land, the Landowners fell short of the required burden of proof.
The trial Court found, as a matter of fact and law, that
the burden of proof and persuasion had been satisfied
and that indeed, the preponderance of the testimony
weighed in favor of the Landowners' testimony as to the
owned property.
The burden of proof claim in Appellant's Brief is a
make-weight argument and is unworthy of consideration.
CONCLUSION
This Appeal is cleanly controlled by the ruling law
of this Court as announced in Prudential Federal Savings q; Loan Assoc. v. St. Paul Insurance Co., 22 U.2d
70, 448 P .2d 724 ( 1968), a case arising out of a remand
and accompanying mandate from an earlier appeal. In
affirming the Judgment of the trial Judge, Henriod, J.,
writing for the Court stated:

1·;

"This appeal is not from a new case, but involves an alleged interpretation of what precisely
we decided in our previous decision, which seems
to revolve about the reversal and remanding of
the case with the interdiction 'consonant with this
opinion.' * * *
"TV e believe that the present so-called appeal
is abortive and is more in the nature of a belated
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petition for rehearing, after a previous app1181
and petition for rehearing in both of which eve~'~
the problems involved here were canvassed a '
resolved. * * *."
,B

ii1

The questions raised by Appellant's counsel in ~ol
case at bar have distinct, parallel import. District Ju~w
Swan, herein, fully carried out the mandate of July~ tl
1970, of this Court, factually determined and resolv11
the severance damage previously awarded as to !a
" nonowne d" 1an d to b~ $~,800.00 an d struck th at dama~u,icl
from the Amended Fmdmgs and Judgment. State coui f
sel' s claim that such determination was factually impfr !
sible of accomplishment by the trial Judge is not, in lai P'
a quarrel with the trial Court's ruling on remand, bu! 1
a quarrel with the mandate of this Court of a year ag,
If the State was displeased now it was equally so thej
and the proper remedy was via a petition for rehear· i
directed to the mandate. This appeal is as deficient an
"abortive" as was that in the Prudential decision.
The mandate of this Court in its Opinion of Jill:
1970, established the "rule of the case" and under tile
doctrine, all subsequent proceedings were governt
thereby. Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d si
( 1948) . The narrow issue of severance damages to tl
"nonowned" land was resolved in the first appeal in If
State's favor. On remand and under the mandate, In
trial Court was able to calculate from the evidence ri
ceived and the notes kept at trial, the nonowned serer
ance damage and such was excised from the Amenor
Findings and Judgment of Just Compensation. In co:
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111sequence, the original Judgment was diminished by
~~5,800.00 together with better than $1,500.00 interest.
~,But rather than this result, Appellant, by this appeal,
iieeks a second crack at a full blown trial de novo on all
~other aspects of value and damage in the case, aspects
~which were never raised, discussed, or touched upon in
~ilie first appeal.

~

The points raised in this A ppe~l are of eph:meral
1character. The law of the case reqmres that the m-fact
~~uetermination made by the D:strict Court in satisfying
fr !he mandate be affirmed in this Appeal and that Apfr pellant' s position be rejected.

i

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
STEWART M. HANSON, JR.
400 El Paso Gas Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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